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Network Security



 EECE 412
 Session 8

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Outline


- Link & end-to-end protocols
- SSL
- IPSec






Examples

- Telnet protocol
 - Messages between client, server enciphered, and encipherment, decipherment occur only at these hosts
 - End-to-end protocol
- PPP Encryption Control Protocol
 - Host gets message, decipheres it
 - Figures out where to forward it
 - Enciphers it in appropriate key and forwards it
 - Link protocol



Link vs. End-to-end protection

<p>Link encryption</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Can protect headers of packets ▪ Possible to hide source and destination • Note: may be able to deduce this from traffic flows 	<p>End-to-end encryption</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cannot hide packet headers ▪ Attacker can read source, destination
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Example Protocols

- Privacy-Enhanced Electronic Mail (PEM)
 - Applications layer protocol
- Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
 - Transport layer protocol
- IP Security (IPSec)
 - Network layer protocol



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


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Secure Socket Layer (SSL) a.k.a. Transport Layer Security (TLS)

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Networks



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SSL Session

Association between two peers

- Two peers may have several sessions
- Information for each association:
 - Unique session identifier
 - Peer's X.509v3 certificate, if needed
 - Compression method
 - Cipher spec for cipher and MAC
 - "Master secret" shared with peer
 - 48 bits



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SSL Connection

Describes how data exchanged with peer in a session

- Several connections per session
- Information for each connection
 - Random data
 - Write keys (used to encipher data)
 - Write MAC key (used to compute MAC)
 - Initialization vectors for ciphers, if needed
 - Sequence numbers



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Supporting Crypto

- All parts of SSL use them
- Initial phase: public key system exchanges keys
 - Messages enciphered using classical ciphers, and MACed
 - Only certain combinations allowed
 - Depends on algorithm for key exchange cipher
 - Key exchange (a.k.a., interchange) algorithms:
 - RSA
 - Diffie-Hellman
 - Fortezza



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RSA: Cipher, MAC Algorithms

Interchange cipher	Classical cipher	MAC Algorithm
RSA, key = 512 bits	none	MD5, SHA
	RC4, 40-bit key	MD5
	RC2, 40-bit key, CBC mode	MD5
	DES, 40-bit key, CBC mode	SHA
RSA	None	MD5, SHA
	RC4, 128-bit key	MD5, SHA
	IDEA, CBC mode	SHA
	DES, CBC mode	SHA
	DES, EDE mode, CBC mode	SHA

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D-H: Cipher, MAC Algorithms

Interchange cipher	Classical cipher	MAC Algorithm
Diffie-Hellman, DSS Certificate	DES, 40-bit key, CBC mode	SHA
	DES, CBC mode	SHA
	DES, EDE mode, CBC mode	SHA
Diffie-Hellman, key = 512 bits RSA Certificate	DES, 40-bit key, CBC mode	SHA
	DES, CBC mode	SHA
	DES, EDE mode, CBC mode	SHA

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
Fortezza: Cipher, MAC Algorithms

Interchange cipher	Classical cipher	MAC Algorithm
Fortezza key exchange	none	SHA
	RC4, 128-bit key	MD5
	Fortezza, CBC mode	SHA

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
SSL Protocols



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SSL Record Layer



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Overview of Handshake Rounds


1. Create SSL connection between client, server
2. Server authenticates itself
3. Client validates server, begins key exchange
4. Acknowledgments all around

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Handshake Round 1

Purpose: Create SSL connection between client, server




v_c Client's version of SSL
 v Highest version of SSL that Client, Server both understand
 r_1, r_2 nonces (timestamp and 28 random bytes)
 sid_1 Current session id (0 if new session)
 sid_2 Current session id (if $s1 = 0$, new session id)
 $ciphers$ Ciphers that client understands
 $comps$ Compression algorithms that client understand
 $cipher$ Cipher to be used
 $comp$ Compression algorithm to be used

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Handshake Round 2

Purpose: Server authenticates itself



Note: if Server not to authenticate itself, only last message sent; third step omitted if Server does not need Client certificate


mod public key modulus
 exp public key exponent
 k_s Server's private key
 $ctype$ Certificate type requested (by cryptosystem)
 gca "Good" certification authorities
 $er2$ End round 2 message

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
Handshake Round 3

Purpose: Client validates server, begins key exchange



Both Client, Server compute master secret $master$:

$master = MD5(pre || SHA('A' || pre || r_1 || r_2) ||$
 $MD5(pre || SHA('BB' || pre || r_1 || r_2) ||$
 $MD5(pre || SHA('CCC' || pre || r_1 || r_2))$





$msgs$ Concatenation of previous messages sent/received this handshake
 $opad, ipad$ As above

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



Handshake Round 4

Client sends "change cipher spec" message using that protocol



Server sends "change cipher spec" message using that protocol



$msgs$ Concatenation of messages sent/received this handshake in previous rounds (does not include these messages)
 $opad, ipad, master$ As above

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SSL Change Cipher Spec Protocol

- Send single byte
- In handshake, new parameters considered "pending" until this byte received

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SSL Alert Protocol

- Closure alert
 - Sender will send no more messages
- Error alerts
 - Warning
 - connection remains open
 - Fatal error
 - connection torn down as soon as sent or received

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





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



IPSec

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- ## IPsec Protocols
- Authentication Header (AH) protocol
 - Message integrity
 - Origin authentication
 - Anti-replay
 - Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol
 - Confidentiality
 - Others provided by AH



IPsec Architecture

Security Policy Database (SPD)

- rules to handle messages
 - discard, add security services, forward unchanged
- associated with network interface
- determines appropriate rule(s) based on IP packet attributes
 - source, destination, transport protocol

Example

- Goals
 - Discard SMTP packets from host 192.168.2.9
 - Forward SMTP packets from 192.168.19.7 without change
 - "Secure" all other SMTP packets to 10.1.2.3-103
- SPD entries


```
src 192.168.2.9, dest 10.1.2.3 to 10.1.2.103, port 25, discard
src 192.168.19.7, dest 10.1.2.3 to 10.1.2.103, port 25, bypass
dest 10.1.2.3 to 10.1.2.103, port 25, applyIPsec
```

IPsec Architecture

Security Association (SA)

- Association between peers for security services
 - Identified by
 1. dest address
 2. security protocol (AH or ESP)
 3. unique 32-bit number (security parameter index, SPI)
- Unidirectional
- SA database (SAD)

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Which to Use: PEM, SSL, IPsec?

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