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Network Security


EECE 412
Session 8

Outline

- Link & end-to-end protocols
- SSL
- IPSec



Networks



Link and End-to-End Protocols

Link Protocol



End-to-End (or E2E) Protocol



Examples

- Telnet protocol
 - Messages between client, server enciphered, and encipherment, decipherment occur only at these hosts
 - End-to-end protocol
- PPP Encryption Control Protocol
 - Host gets message, decipheres it
 - Figures out where to forward it
 - Enciphers it in appropriate key and forwards it
 - Link protocol

Link vs. End-to-end protection

Link encryption

- Can protect headers of packets
- Possible to hide source and destination
 - Note: may be able to deduce this from traffic flows

End-to-end encryption

- Cannot hide packet headers
- Attacker can read source, destination

Example Protocols

- Privacy-Enhanced Electronic Mail (PEM)
 - Applications layer protocol
- Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
 - Transport layer protocol
- IP Security (IPSec)
 - Network layer protocol






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Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
a.k.a.
Transport Layer Security (TLS)

Networks



SSL Session

Association between two peers

- Two peers may have several sessions
- Information for each association:
 - Unique **session identifier**
 - Peer's X.509v3 **certificate**, if needed
 - **Compression method**
 - **Cipher spec** for cipher and MAC
 - "**Master secret**" shared with peer
 - 48 bits

SSL Connection

Describes how data exchanged with peer in a session

- Several connections per session
- Information for each connection
 - Random data
 - **Write keys** (used to encipher data)
 - **Write MAC key** (used to compute MAC)
 - **Initialization vectors** for ciphers, if needed
 - Sequence numbers

Supporting Crypto

- All parts of SSL use them
- Initial phase: public key system exchanges keys
 - Messages enciphered using classical ciphers, and MACed
 - Only certain combinations allowed
 - Depends on algorithm for **key exchange** cipher
 - Key exchange (a.k.a., **interchange**) algorithms:
 - RSA
 - Diffie-Hellman
 - Fortezza

RSA: Cipher, MAC Algorithms

<i>Interchange cipher</i>	<i>Classical cipher</i>	<i>MAC Algorithm</i>
RSA, key \leq 512 bits	<i>none</i>	MD5, SHA
	RC4, 40-bit key	MD5
	RC2, 40-bit key, CBC mode	MD5
	DES, 40-bit key, CBC mode	SHA
RSA	<i>None</i>	MD5, SHA
	RC4, 128-bit key	MD5, SHA
	IDEA, CBC mode	SHA
	DES, CBC mode	SHA
	DES, EDE mode, CBC mode	SHA


D-H: Cipher, MAC Algorithms

<i>Interchange cipher</i>	<i>Classical cipher</i>	<i>MAC Algorithm</i>
Diffie-Hellman, DSS Certificate	DES, 40-bit key, CBC mode	SHA
	DES, CBC mode	SHA
	DES, EDE mode, CBC mode	SHA
Diffie-Hellman, key ≤ 512 bits RSA Certificate	DES, 40-bit key, CBC mode	SHA
	DES, CBC mode	SHA
	DES, EDE mode, CBC mode	SHA


Fortezza: Cipher, MAC Algorithms

<i>Interchange cipher</i>	<i>Classical cipher</i>	<i>MAC Algorithm</i>
Fortezza key exchange	<i>none</i>	SHA
	RC4, 128-bit key	MD5
	Fortezza, CBC mode	SHA

SSL Protocols



SSL Record Layer




Overview of Handshake Rounds

1. Create SSL connection between client, server
2. Server authenticates itself
3. Client validates server, begins key exchange
4. Acknowledgments all around

Handshake Round 1


Purpose: Create SSL connection between client, server



v_C	Client's version of SSL
v	Highest version of SSL that Client, Server both understand
r_1, r_2	nonces (timestamp and 28 random bytes)
sid_1	Current session id (0 if new session)
sid_2	Current session id (if $s1 = 0$, new session id)
$ciphers$	Ciphers that client understands
$comps$	Compression algorithms that client understand
$cipher$	Cipher to be used
$comp$	Compression algorithm to be used

Handshake Round 2

Purpose: Server authenticates itself



Note: if Server not to authenticate itself, only last message sent; third step omitted if Server does not need Client certificate

mod *public key modulus*

exp *public key exponent*

k_s *Server's private key*

ctype *Certificate type requested (by cryptosystem)*

gca *"Good" certification authorities*

er2 *End round 2 message*



Handshake Round 3

Purpose: Client validates server, begins key exchange

Client $\xrightarrow{\{pre\}e_s}$ Server

Both Client, Server compute master secret *master*:

$$\begin{aligned} master = & MD5(pre \parallel SHA('A' \parallel pre \parallel r_1 \parallel r_2) \parallel \\ & MD5(pre \parallel SHA('BB' \parallel pre \parallel r_1 \parallel r_2) \parallel \\ & MD5(pre \parallel SHA('CCC' \parallel pre \parallel r_1 \parallel r_2)) \end{aligned}$$

Client $\xrightarrow{\{h(master \parallel opad \parallel h(msgs \parallel master \parallel ipad))\}}$ Server

msgs Concatenation of previous messages sent/received this handshake
opad, ipad As above

Handshake Round 4

Client sends “change cipher spec” message using that protocol

Client \longrightarrow Server

$\{ h(master \parallel opad \parallel h(msgs \parallel 0x434C4E54 \parallel master \parallel ipad)) \}$

Client \longrightarrow Server

Server sends “change cipher spec” message using that protocol

Client \longleftarrow Server

$\{ h(master \parallel opad \parallel h(msgs \parallel master \parallel ipad)) \}$

Client \longleftarrow Server

msgs Concatenation of messages sent/received this handshake in
previous rounds (does not include these messages)

opad, ipad, master As above



SSL Change Cipher Spec Protocol

- Send single byte
- In handshake, new parameters considered “pending” until this byte received

SSL Alert Protocol


- Closure alert
 - Sender will send no more messages
- Error alerts
 - Warning
 - connection remains open
 - Fatal error
 - connection torn down as soon as sent or received



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IPSec


Networks



IPsec

Provides

- message **confidentiality**
- message **integrity**
- **authentication** of endpoints
- **replay** detection



Transport Mode



- Encapsulate IP packet **data**
- Use IP to send IPsec-wrapped data packet
- Note: IP header not protected

Tunnel Mode




- Encapsulate whole IP packet (**header and data**)
- Use IP to send IPsec-wrapped packet
- Note: IP header protected



IPsec Protocols

- **Authentication Header (AH) protocol**
 - Message integrity
 - Origin authentication
 - Anti-replay
- **Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol**
 - Confidentiality
 - Others provided by AH

Example: Systems



Example: Packets



IPsec Architecture

Security Policy Database (SPD)

- **rules** to handle messages
 - discard, add security services, forward unchanged
- associated with **network interface**
- **determines** appropriate rule(s) based on IP packet attributes
 - source, destination, transport protocol

Example

■ Goals

- Discard SMTP packets from host 192.168.2.9
- Forward SMTP packets from 192.168.19.7 without change
- “Secure” all other SMTP packets to 10.1.2.3-103

■ SPD entries

```
src 192.168.2.9, dest 10.1.2.3 to 10.1.2.103, port 25, discard  
src 192.168.19.7, dest 10.1.2.3 to 10.1.2.103, port 25, bypass  
dest 10.1.2.3 to 10.1.2.103, port 25, apply IPsec
```

IPsec Architecture

Security Association (SA)

- Association between peers for security services
 - Identified by
 1. dest address
 2. security protocol (AH or ESP)
 3. unique 32-bit number (security parameter index, SPI)
- Unidirectional
- SA database (SAD)



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Which to Use: PEM, SSL, IPsec?