

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

# Symmetric Crypto Systems

EECE 412

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### **Module Outline**

Block ciphers "under the hood"Modes of operation for block ciphers





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
### **Block Ciphers "Under the Hood"**

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# Random Permutation (Block Cipher) as Random Oracle

- In
  - fixed size short string (plaintext) M, Quer
    - DES -- 64 bits
  - Key K



#### Out

 same fixed size short string (ciphertext) C

Notation • C = { M }<sub>K</sub> • M = { C }<sub>K</sub>



### **Related Notes**

- Main properties of block ciphers
  - invertible
  - confusing
  - diffusing
- Main block ciphers
  - Data Encryption Standard (DES)
  - Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) a.k.a., Rijndael



### **Advanced Encryption Standard**

- Replacement for DES
- AES competition (late 90's)
  - NSA openly involved
  - Transparent process
  - Many strong algorithms proposed
  - Rijndael Algorithm ultimately selected
    - Pronounced like "Rain Doll" or "Rhine Doll"
- Iterated block cipher (like DES)




### **AES Overview**

- Block size: 128, 192 or 256 bits
- Key length: 128, 192 or 256 bits (independent of block size)
- 10 to 14 rounds (depends on key length)
- Each round uses 4 functions (in 3 "layers")
  - ByteSub (nonlinear layer)
  - ShiftRow (linear mixing layer)
  - MixColumn (nonlinear layer)
  - AddRoundKey (key addition layer)



### **AES ByteSub**

### Assume 192 bit block, 4x6 bytes



- ByteSub is AES's "S-box"
- Can be viewed as nonlinear (but invertible) composition of two math operations





#### Last 4 bits of input

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	с	d	е	f
0	63	7c	77	7Ъ	f2	6b	6f	<b>c</b> 5	30	01	67	2b	fe	d7	ab	76
1	ca	82	c9	7d	fa	59	47	f0	ad	d4	a2	$\mathbf{af}$	9c	a4	72	c0
2	b7	fd	93	26	36	3f	f7	сс	34	a5	e5	f1	71	d8	31	15
3	04	c7	23	c3	18	96	05	9a	07	12	80	e2	eb	27	b2	75
4	09	83	2c	1a	1b	6e	5a	a0	52	Зb	d6	b3	29	e3	2f	84
5	53	d1	00	ed	20	fc	b1	5b	6a	cb	be	39	4a	4c	58	cf
6	d0	ef	aa	fb	43	4d	33	85	45	f9	02	7f	50	3c	9f	a8
7	51	a3	40	8f	92	9d	38	f5	bc	b6	da	21	10	ff	f3	d2
8	cd	0c	13	ec	5f	97	44	17	c4	a7	7e	3d	64	5d	19	73
9	60	81	4f	dc	22	2a	90	88	46	ee	b8	14	de	5e	0b	db
a	e0	32	3a	0a	49	06	24	5c	<b>c</b> 2	d3	ac	62	91	95	e4	79
b	e7	c8	37	6d	8d	d5	4e	a9	6c	56	f4	ea	65	7a	ae	80
С	ba	78	25	2e	1c	a6	Ъ4	c6	e8	dd	74	1f	4b	bd	8b	8a
d	70	3e	b5	66	48	03	f6	0e	61	35	57	b9	86	c1	1d	9e
е	e1	f8	98	11	69	d9	8e	94	9Ъ	1e	87	e9	ce	55	28	df
f	8c	a1	89	0d	bf	<b>e</b> 6	42	68	41	99	2d	0f	Ъ0	54	bb	16



First bits o input

### **AES ShiftRow**


### Cyclic shift rows

m	n	0	p	 no shift m n o p	
j	k	1		cyclic shift by C1 (1)	>i
d	е	f		cyclic shift by C2 (2) d	e
w	x	v	z	 cyclic shift by C3 (8) W X	V



### **AES MixColumn**

### Nonlinear, invertible operation applied to each column



Implemented as a (big) lookup table



### **AES AddRoundKey**

### XOR subkey with block

Γ	$a_{00}$	$a_{01}$	$a_{02}$	$a_{03}$	$a_{04}$	$a_{05}$		$\begin{bmatrix} k_{00} \end{bmatrix}$	$k_{01}$	$k_{02}$	$k_{03}$	$k_{04}$	$k_{05}$ -	] [	$b_{00}$	$b_{01}$	$b_{02}$	$b_{03}$	$b_{04}$	$b_{05}$ ]		
	$a_{10}$	$a_{11}$	$a_{12}$	$a_{13}$	$a_{14}$	$a_{15}$			$k_{10}$	$k_{11}$	$k_{12}$	$k_{13}$	$k_{14}$	$k_{15}$	_	$b_{10}$	$b_{11}$	$b_{12}$	$b_{13}$	$b_{14}$	$b_{15}$	
	$a_{20}$	$a_{21}$	$a_{22}$	$a_{23}$	$a_{24}$	$a_{25}$	θ	$k_{20}$	$k_{21}$	$k_{22}$	$k_{23}$	$k_{24}$	$k_{25}$	_	$b_{20}$	$b_{21}$	$b_{22}$	$b_{23}$	$b_{24}$	$b_{25}$		
L	$a_{30}$	$a_{31}$	$a_{32}$	$a_{33}$	$a_{34}$	$a_{35}$		$\lfloor k_{30}$	$k_{31}$	$k_{32}$	$k_{33}$	$k_{34}$	$k_{35}$ _		$b_{30}$	$b_{31}$	$b_{32}$	$b_{33}$	$b_{34}$	$b_{35}$		

#### Block

### Subkey

# RoundKey (subkey) determined by key schedule algorithm



### **AES Decryption**

- To decrypt, process must be invertible
- Inverse of MixAddRoundKey is easy, since ⊕ is its own inverse
- MixColumn is invertible (inverse is also implemented as a lookup table)
- Inverse of ShiftRow is easy (cyclic shift the other direction)
- ByteSub is invertible (inverse is also implemented as a lookup table)






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# **Modes of Operation**

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### **Electronic Code Book (ECB)**



 $\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{c}_1 \mid \mathbf{c}_2 \mid \dots \mid \mathbf{c}_n$ 


### Drawbacks

- Same message has same ciphertext
- Redundant/repetitive patterns will show through
- Subject to "cut-and-splice" attacks



### Alice in ECB Mode








# **Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)**

### $\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{m}_1 \mid \mathbf{m}_2 \mid \dots \mid \mathbf{m}_n$




 $\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{IV} \mid \mathbf{c}_1 \mid \mathbf{c}_2 \mid \dots \mid \mathbf{c}_n$ 




### Alice in CBC Mode







# **Decryption with CBC**






### **Output Feedback (OFB)**

- $K_1 = \{IV\}_{K'}, K_2 = \{K_1\}_{K'}, \dots, K_i = \{K_{i-1}\}_{K}, \dots$
- Purpose: use block cipher as a stream cipher
- $C_i = \{m_i\}_{Ki}, e.g., c_i = m_i \oplus K_i$



### **Cipher Feedback (CFB) Mode**

### $\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{m}_1 \mid \mathbf{m}_2 \mid \dots \mid \mathbf{m}_n$



 $\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{IV} \mid \mathbf{c}_1 \mid \mathbf{c}_2 \mid \dots \mid \mathbf{c}_n$ 



### **Counter Encryption**

- Drawbacks of feedback modes
  - Hard to parallelize
    - CBC -- cannot precompute
    - OFB -- memory requirements
- $K_i = \{IV + i\}_K$




# Message Authentication Code (MAC)

### Purpose

protect message integrity and authenticity


How to do MAC with a block cipher?



How to do MAC and encryption of a message?



# Hash Function from a Block Cipher



### h = H(M)

- **1.** Easy to compute h from M
- 2. Hard to compute M from h
- **3**. For given M, hard to find another M' s.t. H(M) == H(M')
- 4. Hard to find some M & M' s.t. H(M) == H(M') collision-resistance



### **Common Hash Functions and Applications**

- Common hash functions
  - (Message Digest) MD5 value 128b
  - (Secure Hash Algorithm) SHA-1 160b value, SHA-256, SHA-512
- Applications
  - MACs
    - $MAC_{K}(M) = H(K,M)$
    - $\mathsf{HMAC}_{\mathsf{K}}(\mathsf{M}) = \mathsf{H}(\mathsf{K} \oplus \mathsf{A}, \mathsf{H}(\mathsf{K} \oplus \mathsf{B}, \mathsf{M}))$
  - Time stamping service
  - key updating
    - $K_i = H(K_{i-1})$
    - Backward security
  - Autokeying
    - $K_{i+1} = H(K_i, M_{i1}, M_{i2}, ...)$
    - Forward security



# **Key Points**

- Ciphers are either substitution, transposition (a.k.a., permutation), or product
- Any block cipher should confuse and defuse
- Block ciphers are implemented in SP-networks
- Stream ciphers and hash functions are commonly implemented with block ciphers
- Hash functions used for
  - fingerprinting data, MAC, key updating, autokeying,

