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Authentication

What is Authentication?

- Real-world and computer world examples?
- What is a result of authentication?
- What are the means for in the digital world?



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Basics and Terminology

definition

authentication is binding of
identity to subject

- Identity is that of external entity
- Subject is computer entity
- Subject a.k.a. principal

What Authentication Factors are used?

- What you know
- What you have
- What you are



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Password-based Authentication

What's Password?

- Lots of things act as passwords!
 - PIN
 - Social security number
 - Mother's maiden name
 - Date of birth
 - Name of your pet, etc.
- Sequence of words
 - Examples: pass-phrases
- Algorithms
 - Examples: challenge-response, one-time passwords

Keys vs Passwords

Crypto keys

- Suppose key is 64 bits
- Then 2^{64} keys
- Choose key at random
- Then attacker must try about 2^{63} keys

Passwords

- Suppose passwords are 8 characters, and 256 different characters
- Then $256^8 = 2^{64}$ pwds
- Users do not select password at random
- Attacker has far less than 2^{63} pwds to try (**dictionary attack**)

Why not Crypto Keys?

"Humans are incapable of securely storing high-quality cryptographic keys, and they have unacceptable speed and accuracy when performing cryptographic operations.

(They are also large, expensive to maintain, difficult to manage, and they pollute the environment.

It is astonishing that these devices continue to be manufactured and deployed.

But they are sufficiently pervasive that we must design our protocols around their limitations.)"

Charlie Kaufman, Radia Perlman, Mike Speciner
in "Network Security: Private Communication in a Public World"

Why Passwords?

- Why is “something you know” more popular than “something you have” and “something you are”?
- **Cost:** passwords are free
- **Convenience:** easier for SA to reset password than to issue new smartcard

Good and Bad Passwords


bad passwords?

- frank
- Fido
- password
- 4444
- Pikachu
- 102560
- AustinStamp
- samfox

good passwords?

- jflej,43j-EmmL+y
- 09864376537263
- P0kem0N
- FSa7Yago
- 0nceuP0nAtIm8
- PokeGCTall150

European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN)



source:ebaumsworld.com



source:ebaumsworld.com



source: gallery.hd.org

Samanta Fox



<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-WrVrlZ4p4Q>

Attacks on Passwords

- Attacker could...
 - Target one particular account
 - Target any account on system
 - Target any account on any system
 - Attempt denial of service (DoS) attack
- Common attack path
 - Outsider → normal user → administrator
 - May only require **one** weak password!

How to Store Passwords in the System?

- Store as cleartext
 - If password file compromised, all passwords revealed
- Encipher file
 - Need to have decipherment, encipherment keys in memory
- Store one-way hash of password

Password File

- Bad idea to store passwords in a file
- But need a way to verify passwords
- Cryptographic solution: hash the passwords
 - Store $y = \text{hash}(\text{password})$
 - Can verify entered password by hashing
 - If attacker obtains password file, he does not obtain passwords
 - But attacker with password file can guess x and check whether $y = \text{hash}(x)$
 - If so, attacker has found password!

Dictionary Attack

- “online” or “offline”
- Attacker pre-computes $\text{hash}(x)$ for all x in a dictionary of common passwords --- Rainbow Table
- Suppose attacker gets access to password file containing hashed passwords
 - Attacker only needs to compare hashes to his pre-computed dictionary
 - Same attack will work each time
- Can we prevent this attack? Or at least make attacker’s job more difficult?

Password File

- Store hashed passwords
- Better to hash with salt
- Given password, choose random s , compute

$$y = \text{hash}(\text{password}, s)$$

and store the pair (s,y) in the password file

- Note: The salt s is not secret
- Easy to verify password
- Attacker must recompute dictionary hashes for each user — lots more work!

Assumptions for Password Cracking

- Passwords are 8 chars, 128 choices per character

Then $128^8 = 2^{56}$ possible passwords

- Attacker has dictionary of 2^{20} common pwds
- Probability of 1/4 that a pwd is in dictionary
- Work is measured by number of hashes

Password Cracking

- Finding single password without dictionary
 - Must try $2^{56}/2 = 2^{55}$ on average
 - Just like exhaustive key search

- Finding single password with dictionary
 - Expected work is about

$$1/4 (2^{19}) + 3/4 (2^{55}) = 2^{54.6}$$

- But in practice, try all in dictionary and quit if not found — work is at most 2^{20} and probability of success is $1/4$

password cracking without dictionary

- there is a password file with 2^{10} pwds
- goal: Find any of 1024 passwords in file

Without dictionary:

- assume all 2^{10} passwords are distinct
- need 2^{55} comparisons before expect to find password
- if no salt, each hash computation gives 2^{10} comparisons \Rightarrow

the expected work (number of hashes) is

$$2^{55}/2^{10} = 2^{45}$$

- if salt is used, expected work is 2^{55} since each comparison requires a new hash computation

password cracking with a dictionary

- Find any of 1024 passwords in file
- With dictionary
 - Probability at least one password is in dictionary is
$$1 - (3/4)^{1024} = 1$$
 - We ignore case where no password is in dictionary
 - If no salt, work is about
$$2^{19}/2^{10} = 2^9$$
 - If salt, expected work is less than 2^{22}
 - Note: If no salt, we can precompute all dictionary hashes and amortize the work (Rainbow Tables)

Other Password Issues

- Too many passwords to remember
 - Results in password reuse
 - Why is this a problem?
- Failure to change default passwords
- Social engineering
- Error logs may contain “almost” passwords
- Bugs, keystroke logging, spyware, etc.



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example











the camera transmits photos wirelessly up to 200 meters



the camera has its own battery and transmission antenna



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Shoulder surfing of ATM in Brazil

<http://www.snopes.com/fraud/atm/atmcamera.asp>

the bottom line

- Password cracking is too easy!
 - One weak password may break security
 - Users choose bad passwords
 - Social engineering attacks, etc.
- The bad guy has all of the advantages
- All of the math favors bad guys
- Passwords are a big security problem

how to improve password-based systems?

- Against off-line password guessing
- Random selection
- Pronounceable passwords
 - przbqxdfi, zxrptglfn
 - helgoret, juttelon
- User selection of passwords
- Proactive password checking for “goodness”
- Password aging
- Against guessing many accounts
 - Salting

Against on-line password guessing

- Backoff
- Disconnection
- Disabling
- Jailing