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Malicious Logic

EECE 412

Outline

- Theory & Malware
 - Viruses
 - classification
 - Worms
 - components
 - Other malware
- Protection and Detection Techniques



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Malicious Logic

Malicious Code Types

- Trojan horse
- virus
- worm
- rabbit/bacterium
- logic bomb
- trapdoor/backdoor

Non-malicious program errors

- **buffer overflow**
 - data replaces instructions
- **incomplete mediation**
 - sensitive data are in exposed, uncontrolled condition
- **time-of-check to time-of-use errors**
 - leaving opportunity to changing data/request after it was checked/authorized and before it was used/processed
- **mistakes in using** security mechanisms

Whys

- Why is malicious logic bad?
- Why should we know how it works?

Trojan Horses

- has **overt** and **covert** effects
 - Examples of overt and covert effects?
- propagating Trojan horse
- Thompson's experiment with a Trojan horse
 1. Add TH to a login program source code
 - $\text{login} + \text{TH} = \text{login}'$
 2. Add TH to the compiler
 - $\text{compiler} + \text{TH} = \text{compiler}'$
 - $\text{compile}'(\text{login}) = \text{login}'$
 3. Add TH to the old compiler to build new compiler'
 - $\text{compile}(\text{compiler}) = \text{compiler}'$
 - $\text{compile}'(\text{login}) = \text{login}'$
 - Thompson, K. 1984. Reflections on trusting trust. Communications of ACM 27, 8 (Aug. 1984), pp.761-763. DOI=<http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/358198.358210>



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Computer Viruses

What's a Computer Virus?

Program that

1. "infects" other programs with itself, and
2. performs some (possibly null) action



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Computer Worms

What's a Computer Worm?

"an independently replicating and autonomous infection agent, capable of seeking out new host systems and infecting them via the network"

Jose Nazario in

"Defense and Detection Strategies Against Internet Worms"

What's the difference between computer worms and viruses?

Components of a Worm (Network)

1. **Reconnaissance**: finding hosts to attack
2. **Attack**: launching an attack
3. **Communication**: enabling communications among worm nodes as well as with other central location(s)
4. **Command**: providing interface for receiving commands
5. **Intelligence**: managing information about the worm nodes

Example: Ramen Worm (2000–2001)

1. calls RNG to get a random class B subnet
2. adds the worm startup script to /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit
3. starts an HTTP server on port 27374
4. patches the exploits that it used for the attack
 1. Kills the process & removes rpc.statd binaries
 2. Disables anonymous FTP
5. Uses modified *synscan* to contact a random IP address and check the FTP banner

220 foo.com FTP server (Version wu-2.6.0(1) ...) ready.)

to determine if the machine is running Red Hat Linux 6.2 or Red Hat Linux 7.0.
 - Red Hat 6.2: exploits rpc.statd or wuftp service vulnerability.
 - Red Hat 7.0: exploits LPRng vulnerability.
6. downloads the rest from the attacking machine
7. extracts the contents and executes start.sh
8. sends email message anonymous Yahoo! and Hotmail email account specifying the IP address of the attacked machine.
9. Replaces host's index.html with ...



RameN Crew

Hackers loooooooooooooooooooooove noodles.™

This site powered by



Ramen Components

1. Reconnaissance

TCP SYN scanning (*synscan*) & FTP banner analysis

2. Attack

1. FTPd string format exploits in wu-ftpd 2.6.0
2. RPC.statd Linux unformatted strings exploits
3. LPR string format exploits

3. Communication

Lynx, mail, TCP-only


4. Command

Simple web server that dumped ramen.tgz

5. Intelligence

Two anonymous E-mail accounts (Yahoo! & Hotmail)

How about Sapphire/Slammer Worm?



maximum spread

- 75,000 systems in 10 minutes
- doubling every 8 seconds

Damages Caused by Sapphire/ Slammer Worm

- Over a **billion dollars** total
- Many **ATMs** of Bank of America and Washington Mutual were **down between one and three days** (Lemos, 2003).
- Continental **Airlines, unable to process tickets, canceled flights** from its Newark hub (Boutin, 2003).
- Suburban Seattle emergency **911 network became inoperable**, the dispatchers resorted to paper (Boutin, 2003).
- Monitoring computers at Davis-Besse **nuclear plant were unavailable** for 4 h 50 m on January 25, 2003. (NRC, 2003)
- \$13,000 per machine (Spafford, 2003)
- **\$1.7 million per second** (Spafford, 2003)
- 2,000 victim systems in Canada

Other Forms of Malicious Logic

- rabbit/bacterium
 - replicates itself without limit to exhaust resource
- logic bomb
 - goes off when specific condition occurs
- trapdoor/backdoor
 - allows system access through undocumented means



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Malware Theory

Could we detect any malware?

Could an **algorithm** exist that would determine if an **arbitrary** program contains a **malicious code**?

Relevant Results

- There is **no generic technique** for detecting **all** malicious logic
- Detection and protection focus on **particular** aspects of **specific logic**



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Particular Aspects of Malware and Corresponding Protection and Detection Techniques

Malware Acting Both as Data and Code

Approach: **Keep data and code separate**

Techniques

- Allow files to be either modifiable or executable but not both
- Change the type of modified executable to “data”
- Require explicit actions to make data executable

Malware Uses Privileges of Authorized Users

Approach: **Reduce the amount of damage**

Techniques:

- Restrict how far data can travel
- Exercise the **principle of least privilege**
- Sandboxing

Malware Uses Sharing to Cross Protection Domain Boundaries

Approach: **Prevent data sharing**

Techniques:

- Assign programs lowest security level in MLS systems

Malware Alters Files

Approach: **Detect Alterations**

Techniques:

- Signature blocks
- Virus signatures used by antivirus scanners

Malware Performs Actions Beyond Specification

Approach: **Treat the problem as a Fault Tolerance one**

Techniques:

- N-version programming: votes on results
- Proof-carrying code: proving compliance with safety requirements

Malware

Alters Statistical Characteristics

Approach: **Detect statistical changes**

Techniques:

- Detecting abnormal activities on systems or networks

summary

Aspect of Malware	Protection/Detection Technique
Acting both as data and code	Keep data and code separate
Uses privileges of authorized users	Reduce the amount of damage
Uses sharing to cross protection domain boundaries	Prevent data sharing
Alters files	Detect alterations
Performs actions beyond specification	Treat the problem as a Fault Tolerance one
Alters statistical characteristics	Detect statistical changes

module summary

- theory of malware
 - Viruses
 - Worms
 - etc.
- protection and detection techniques