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Social, Economic, and Organizational aspects of computer security

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traditional view

Why are computer systems insecure?

- reason: lack of features – crypto, authentication, filtering
- solution: provide better, cheaper security features – AES, PKI, firewalls

but there are phenomena that cannot be explained using traditional view

- Electronic banking:
 - UK banks were less liable for fraud, so ended up suffering more internal fraud and more errors
- Distributed denial of service:
 - viruses now don't attack the infected machine so much as using it to attack others
- Microsoft is software:
 - insecure, despite market dominance



why is that?

socioeconomic view

- Systems are often insecure because the people who guard them, or who could fix them, have insufficient incentives
- Bank customers suffer when poorly-designed bank systems make fraud and phishing easier
- Casino websites suffer when infected PCs run DDoS attacks on them
- Insecurity is often what economists call an 'externality' – a side-effect, like environmental pollution



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IT economics

network effects

- Metcalfe's law
 - the value of a network is the square of the number of users
- Real networks – phones, fax, email
- Virtual networks – PC architecture versus MAC, or Symbian versus WinCE
- Network effects tend to lead to dominant firm markets where the winner takes all

high fixed costs and low marginal costs

- Competition can drive down prices to marginal cost of production
- This can make it hard to recover capital investment, unless stopped by patent, brand, compatibility ...
- These effects can also lead to dominant-firm market structures

switching from one product or service to another is expensive

- E.g. switching from Windows to Linux means retraining staff, rewriting apps
- Shapiro-Varian theorem:
 - the net present value of a software company is the total switching costs
- So major effort goes into managing switching costs – once you have \$3000 worth of songs on a \$300 iPod, you're locked into iPods

dominant-firm markets

- High fixed/low marginal costs, network effects and switching costs all tend to lead to dominant-firm markets with big first-mover advantage
- So time-to-market is critical
- Microsoft philosophy of “we’ll ship it Tuesday and get it right by version 3” is not perverse behavior by Bill Gates but quite rational
- Whichever company had won in the PC OS business would have done the same

how to build a monopoly on an IT market

- you must appeal to vendors of complementary products
 - application software developers in the case of
 - PC versus Apple,
 - iPhone versus Linux/Windows/J2EE
- once you have a monopoly, lock it all down!

summary on IT economics

- network effects
- high fixed costs and low marginal costs
- switching from one product or service to another is expensive
- above factors tend to lead to dominant-firm markets with big first-mover advantage
- winners appeal to application developers, and then lock developers and users in



IT economics
meets
computer security

why Windows was so insecure?

- lack of security in earlier versions of Windows made it easier to develop applications
- so did the choice of security technologies that dump usability costs on the user (SSL, not SET)

Security products and “lemons market”

- Why are so many security products ineffective?
- Akerlof’s Nobel-prizewinning paper, “The Market for Lemons” introduced asymmetric information
- Suppose a town has 100 used cars for sale: 50 good ones worth \$2,000 and 50 lemons worth \$1,000
- What is the equilibrium price of used cars?
- If \$1,500, no good cars will be offered for sale ...
- Started the study of asymmetric information

lessons from the conflict theory

- Does the defense of a country or a system depend on the least effort, on the best effort, or on the sum of efforts?
- the last is optimal; the first is really awful
- software is a mix: it depends on
 - the worst effort of the least careful programmer,
 - the best effort of the security architect, and
 - the sum of efforts of the testers
- moral: hire fewer better programmers, more testers, top architects

adverse selection and moral hazard matter

- why do Volvo drivers have more accidents?
- application to trust: Ben Edelman, 'Adverse selection on online trust certifications' (WEIS 06)
 - websites with a TRUSTe certification are more than twice as likely to be malicious
- the top Google ad is about twice as likely as the top free search result to be malicious (other search engines worse ...)
- Conclusion: "Don't click on ads"

why companies spend on security what they spend?

- large companies spend too much on security and small companies too little.
- research shows an adverse selection effect
 - corporate security managers tend to be risk-averse people, often from accounting / finance
 - more risk-loving people may become sales or engineering staff, or small-firm entrepreneurs
- also due-diligence, government and insurance regulations

summary on economics & security

- insecure platforms are easier to develop for, and thus attract application developers
- markets of IT security/secure products are “lemons markets” with only “lemons” tend to be sold
- hire fewer better programmers, more testers, top architects
- large companies spend too much on security and small companies too little

credits and further reading

This presentation is based on material from the following

- Ross Anderson, “**Security Engineering**” 2nd edition. Chapter 7.
- Ross Anderson, “**Towards a science of security and human behaviour,**” invited talk at SOUPS 2008, Pittsburgh, PA, July 24.